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Virtually all organizations are concerned about employee safety and the
prevention of workplace accidents, but maybe unaware that most accidents are the cause
of unsafe employee behaviors. In this study, one company in particular wanted to know
where, when, how, and why accidents were occurring in its plant.
Accidents of the past three years were content analyzed. The results show that
87.4% of the accidents were due to unsafe behaviors. The highest absolute frequency of
accidents occurs in the die cast area, while the highest relative rate of accidents occurs in
the furnace room. The type of accident that occurs with the highest frequency is
lacerations and the highest rate of accidents occurs during the first shift.
The accident analysis can now serve as the basis for the development of a
behavioral safety training program. With its implementation, a behavioral safety program
has the potential to save thousands of dollars and give the workers a safer environment in
which to work.

v

Introduction
Virtually all organizations are concerned about employee safety and the
prevention of workplace accidents. An effective approach to controlling workplace
accidents is the behavioral approach to safety. The behavioral approach to safety is the
concept that employees' behavior in the workplace significantly impacts the number of
accidents that occur. The behavioral approach to safety is most often utilized in
behavioral safety programs, which organizations develop to reduce the accident rate and
change their employees' attitudes about safety in the workplace.
This researcher will discuss the role of government in safety and behavioral safety
programs, followed by the need for behavioral safety and its principles. The roles that
both employees and management play in promoting behavioral safety will be reviewed.
Finally, the available behavioral safety literature will be discussed.
The Role of Government in Safety
Nearly every employee in the United States is under the jurisdiction of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Workplace safety is an
important concern for organizations, but it wasn't officially recognized until Congress
passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The recognition of workplace
safety led to the creation of OSHA in 1971 ("OSHA Facts," 2003). OSHA's mission is to
ensure safe and healthy workplaces in America, with the assistance and cooperation of
both federal and state governments. Since 1971, workplace fatalities have been cut in half
and occupational injury and illness rates have declined 40 percent. The government must
continue to work in partnership with employers and employees to prevent injuries and
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ensure a safe working environment ("OSHA Facts," 2003). The facts alone show that
OSHA has made a difference in the past thirty-two years.
OSHA has a staff of 2,303, including approximately 1,123 inspectors, complaint
and discrimination investigators, engineers, physicians, educators, standards writers, and
other personnel spread over 200 offices throughout the country ("OSHA Facts," 2003;
"OSHA Mission," 2003). The staff sets standards, enforces those standards, and reaches
out to employers and employees through technical assistance or consultation programs.
There are also other users of OSHA's services, such as lawyers, journalists, and the
academic community ("OSHA Mission," 2003).
On May 12, 2003, OSHA launched a five-year plan to reduce workplace fatalities,
injuries, and illnesses (Hofmann, 2003). By 2008, OSHA hopes to see a 15% reduction in
workplace fatalities and a 20% reduction in workplace injuries and illnesses. OSHA plans
to achieve these goals by emphasizing safety improvements in specific areas. The plan
includes reducing hazards through direct intervention, promoting a safe culture through
compliance assistance, and maximizing its own effectiveness.
It is important for an organization to increase workplace safety, not only for the
employees' well being, but also for its own success. When an employee is injured on the
job, the results are lost time and production, medical expenses, rehabilitation, and higher
worker's compensation premiums (Lazzara & Kren, 2003). The liabilities of industrial
injuries are increasing at an alarming rate (Geller, 2001). Each year, employers are
paying approximately $200 billion in direct costs associated with injuries both on and off
the job. Many injuries go unaccounted for and OSHA does not record deaths, suicides,
and homicides in calculating their estimates.
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According to a recent poll by the Liberty Mutual Group, 61% of executives claim
each dollar spent on enhancing workplace safety saves their organization three dollars
(Lazzara & Kren, 2003). Ninety-five percent believe workplace safety positively impacts
a company's financial performance. With OSHA's help, employers can find out how
much a workplace accident would cost them. They can download free, interactive
software to estimate average direct and indirect costs of injuries and illnesses.
The Need for Behavior-Based Safety
There are a number of different approaches to maximize safety. The two
dominant approaches are the engineering approach and the behavioral approach. Strong
arguments have been made both for and against each approach. The engineering or
ergonomics approach to workplace safety focuses on making changes to workplace
stations and to the overall workplace environment (Loafmann, 2001). These safety
changes can decrease the number of injuries sustained by employees, but they cannot
prevent employees from committing unsafe acts. Organizations are beginning to realize
that in order to succeed, they must begin to understand and address human behavior. The
behavioral approach to safety focuses on employees' safe or at risk behaviors in the
workplace (Schatz, 2003). At risk behaviors refer to behaviors such as not wearing
goggles, taking shortcuts, or ignoring safety rules while on the job. The behavioral
approach to safety was given the name, behavior-based safety (BBS), as it became more
popular among safety professionals in the 1970's.
The behavioral approach did not become popular until the late 1970's, but safety
research by behavioral scientists had begun as early as 1930 (Petersen, 2000). Even at an
early stage in behavioral safety research, Heinrich (Petersen, 2000) and his colleagues
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found that an overwhelming number of accidents (88 %) were due to unsafe acts on the
part of employees. Relatively few accidents, approximately 10 %, are considered to be
the result of mechanical or physical conditions (Komaki, Barwick, & Scott, 1978). The
continuation of this type of research led to the foundation of the behavioral safety
concept. The behavioral approach identifies the desired performance and provides a
positive means of motivating employees to consistently perform in a safe manner.
Employees can be given positive reinforcement such as informational, social, and
tangible rewards for performing safe acts (Komaki, et al., 1978). Some researchers
consider the behavioral approach to be a proactive approach to safety because it focuses
on the at risk behavior that might produce an accident or near miss rather than trying to
correct the problem after the accident or occurrence (Schatz, 2003).
In 1970, Bird and Schlesinger introduced the concept of safe behavior
reinforcement to the safety profession (Petersen, 2000). The researchers did not invent
the concept themselves, but merely borrowed it from the field of psychology and
suggested its potential application to the safety profession. Behavioral concepts
introduced by distinguished researchers such as John Watson, Ivan Pavlov, and B.F.
Skinner are the foundation for the behavioral approach to safety. As early as 1910,
Watson insisted that psychologists focus on observable behaviors. In the 1920's, Pavlov
demonstrated that over a period of time behavior could be influenced by words. In the
late 1940's, Skinner demonstrated that behavior could be changed by attaching a
consequence immediately following behavior. Unfortunately, even though safety
professionals agreed with the findings, they did not take action. In a sense, the
fundamentals of the behavioral approach to safety had been ignored for almost 50 years.
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Many safety professionals present BBS approaches as new knowledge, but they are based
on well-known, available information (Petersen, 2000).
Principles of Behavior-Based Safety
A number of books and articles have been written that describe the principles and
procedures of BBS. In addition, there have been many systematic reviews of the
literature, providing hard evidence for the success of this approach to injury prevention
(Geller, 2001). The successful applications of BBS generally adhere to seven key
principles. The first principle is from the work of B. F. Skinner. It states that the
intervention should be focused on observable behaviors. In other words, BBS focuses on
what people do, analyzes why they do it, and then applies a research-supported
intervention strategy to improve what people do (Geller, 2001).
The second principle states that it is necessary to look for external factors to
understand and improve behavior (Geller, 2001). Rather than try to objectively define
internal states or traits, it is far more cost effective to identify factors present in the
environment that may influence behavior. These factors can then be changed when
behavior modification is required. An analysis of risky work practices can pinpoint many
determinants of these behaviors (Geller, 2001). Such determinants include environmental
factors and inadequate management practices, which could be overlooked without the use
of BBS principles.
The third principle states that behavior should be directed with activators and
motivated by consequences (Geller, 2001). In B.F. Skinner's research, he theorized that
all behaviors are functions of antecedents (also called activators) and that there are
consequences of those behaviors (Reynolds, 1998). The antecedents tell us what to do in
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order to receive a consequence (Geller, 2001). We follow through with the activated
behavior because we expect that it will provide a pleasant consequence or help us avoid
an unpleasant consequence. This principle is referred to as the ABC model, with "A" for
antecedent, "B" for behavior, and "C" for consequence. It is a method used for analyzing
and developing ways to influence safe and at risk behavior (Krause, 1998). Users of the
BBS approach use this three-term contingency model to design interventions for
improving behavior at individual, group, and organizational levels (Geller, 2001).
According to Reynolds (1998), antecedents can be thought of as "pre-existing
sensory and intellectual input that influence one's decision-making process" (p. 23). In
other words, they are initiators of performance (behavior). The following are two
antecedents thought to elicit safe behavior: knowledge of peer observation and the
activity of being observed (Krause, 1998). The use of antecedents prompts people to
perform behaviors when they know they are being observed. Consequences are events
that occur as a result of behavior (Reynolds, 1998). Based on how important the
consequence is to the individual, the behavior will either be reinforced or discouraged.
Consequences often come in the form of verbal, visual, and summary feedback for safe
behavior (Krause, 1998). The consequence is receiving the feedback that helps the
employees avoid exposure to injuries. Another powerful consequence is that employees
are able to provide regular input about workplace improvements. They are empowered
because they are in a position to make safety observations based on their daily work
experiences.
The fourth principle insists that users of BBS focus on positive consequences to
motivate behavior (Geller, 2001). A substantial amount of behavioral research and
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motivational theories justify the advocacy of positive reinforcement over punishment
contingencies, "whether contrived to improve someone else's behavior or imagined to
motivate personal rule-governed behavior" (Malott, 1992, as cited in Geller, 2001, p. 91).
It is much easier to implement punishment contingencies on a large scale. Hence, this
form of behavior management is a common one. For example, the government passes
laws and then enforces them. As a result, Americans avoid breaking the newly enforced
laws. Regarding industrial safety, however, it is often possible to intervene and increase
employee's perceptions that they are working to achieve success rather than working to
avoid failure (Geller, 2001).
The fifth principle emphasizes the application of the scientific method to improve
interventions (Geller, 2001). Systematic and scientific observations enable the kind of
objective feedback needed to discover what does and does not work to improve unsafe
behavior. Specific behavior can be objectively observed and measured before and after
the chosen intervention so that feedback can be provided and improvements can be made.
Users of the BBS approach should first define what specific safe or at risk behaviors they
want to target. Then, employers and employees need to make behavioral observations
regarding these behaviors. This observation stage is considered a learning process for
people to discover behaviors and conditions that either need to be changed or continued
in order to prevent injuries. After the observation stage, an intervention is applied in an
attempt to decrease or continue the chosen behavior. Following the intervention,
feedback is provided in the form of a checklist that identifies the frequency of safe and at
risk behaviors. Finally, the intervention is evaluated by the level of improvement in the
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targeted behavior. At this point, the intervention is either continued, refined, or another
intervention can be chosen (Geller, 2001).
The sixth principle emphasizes the use of theory to integrate information, not to
limit possibilities (Geller, 2001). Although most research is theory driven, B. F. Skinner
was critical of designing research projects to test theory. This type of research can narrow
the perspective of the investigator and limit the extent of the findings from the scientific
method. It is better for researchers to be open to many possibilities for improving safety
performance than to be motivated to support one particular process (Geller, 2001).
The final principle states that design interventions should take internal feelings
and attitudes into consideration (Geller, 2001). This principle is taken from the concerns
of B. F. Skinner about unobservable attitudes or feeling states. The type of behaviorfocused intervention implemented indirectly influences internal feelings or attitudes.
Developers and managers of a BBS process should use careful consideration of such
relationships. This principle can be accomplished through the use of one-on-one
interviews, group discussions, or formally with a perception survey. Sometimes however,
basic common sense is as good as any evidence one could gather from subjective
evaluations of other persons' feeling states (Geller, 2001).
Behavioral Safety Programs
The design of behavioral safety programs is based on the principles of behavioral
safety. These safety programs are not usually referred to by an official title such as
behavioral safety programs (Topf, 1998). Instead, they are referred to as safety meetings,
motivational efforts, safety manuals, a discipline system, an active training system,
written policies and other related components. It is important to note that one type of
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safety program is not more essential than the next. For example, safety manuals are not
more important than safety meetings. The programs work collectively, each contributing
to an effective whole.
Many strictly BBS approaches are structured primarily around observation of
behaviors and feedback (Topf, 1998). These traditional methods are useful to ensure
acceptance of the process and permanence of behavioral change. However, an
organization must reach beyond behavior to affect the way employees think and feel.
Employee belief systems about safety must change, which in turn, promotes change in
individual and group attitudes and the behavior needed to produce an organizational
culture change.
The primary goal of the behavioral process is to produce self-motivated, selfmanaged employees who behave in a safe manner even when their supervisor is not
present and when no rewards or punishment are given as a result of their good behavior
(Topf, 1998). Once safe attitudes are in place, observation and reinforcement can be
introduced to encourage and support safe behaviors and correct or improve undesired
behaviors.
Behavior-Based Safety in Organizations
In many settings, BBS has become an important facet in the total injury
prevention package (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000). It has been integrated with areas
such as ergonomics, engineering, training, and occupational health and safety
management. An important concern of critics, however, is that BBS may have the
potential to encourage companies to place all responsibility for safety on the employees
and then blame them when accidents occur (Atkinson, 2000). Experts say that if this
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placement on the employee does occur, BBS will indefinitely fail. Safety-related
behaviors not only include those of the employees but also those of supervisors,
managers, and others whose support is crucial (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000).
The overall focus of behavior-based safety must remain on management. Safety
can only be achieved when both management and employees work together and perceive
safety as a value, not a priority subject to changes depending on other circumstances
(Petersen, 2000). Safety managers are beginning to recognize that culture as perceived by
employees dictates which elements of a safety program will work and which will not.
From the perspective of organizations, if a behavior-based system adds value, it will
remain; if it creates waste, it will be terminated. Also, if BBS is considered to be a
program, it has no future. If perceived as the way we manage, BBS will survive.
Executives, stockholders, and directors focus on the bottom line and want to know how
much it will cost and what will they get in return (Sulzer-Azaroff & Austin, 2000). BBS
data are beginning to show short and long-term savings due to reduced injuries and their
associated costs. These costs include insurance rates, direct medical expenses, equipment
replacement and repair, down-time and lost-time costs.
Behavior-Based Safety and Employees
The question that remains on the minds of safety managers is how can they turn
unsafe, risky behaviors into safe behaviors? First and foremost, it is done by involving
personnel in the process (Schatz, 2003). Historically, most safety awareness programs
consist of an instructor speaking before a group and communicating safety information
with little or no feedback from employees. Employees are given more control through
BBS (Atkinson, 2000). One approach to behavior-based safety training includes
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personnel by having a group discussion concerning the hazards and critical safe and atrisk behaviors of a particular job (Schatz, 2003). Employees are instructed to become
observers by watching and interviewing their peers at work. Next, the observers share the
results with the employees they observed in group meetings and one-on-one sessions.
Participants in this process then discuss techniques to increase long-term improvement at
work. When observed by their peers, employees become consciously aware of what and
how they are performing. If reinforced over a period of time, a new behavior can be
established (Schatz, 2003).
Safety is an important component of human resource management and equally,
human resource management is an important component of safety (Schatz, 2003). The
human resources manager should be aware that while BBS provides a positive and
proactive impact on personnel in the workforce, it can be quite costly. The primary costs
come from hiring a competent, qualified consultant and the loss of production time, as the
employees are involved in the process. However, Schatz (2003) insists that the lost
production time should be compensated for by lower accident rates and lower worker
compensation premiums. Another major benefit of BBS is that with employee
involvement, a deeper relationship evolves between the company and its co-workers,
improving the overall morale of the organization, which in turn improves safety and
production. Employees now have significant input into the safety program (Atkinson,
2000). No one wants to see a co-worker hurt. With BBS, employees are given permission
to help each other work safely.
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Behavior-Based Safety and Management
Safety professionals have long been aware of the importance of management
support and involvement in achieving effective safety improvement (Cook & McSween,
2000). They know that for behavioral safety to have an impact, safety management
systems must promote permanent change (Barrett, 2000). To achieve this effect,
management must address the three key areas of the safety management triad. This triad
includes people, environment, and policies/procedures. People refers to attitudes, values,
training, pace, prejudices, locus of control and experience. Environment refers to
equipment design, layout and condition, housekeeping, and weather. Policies/procedures
refer to those policies, procedures, and practices that allow people to successfully interact
with the environment. These three elements combine to produce the antecedents that
direct behavior and the consequences that drive it. Current safety approaches address
these three elements through various methods. Training, safety committees, and
behavioral processes focus on the element, people. Walkthrough inspections, process
hazard reviews, and maintenance notifications address the element, environment.
Operating procedures, job safety analyses, and audits address the element,
policies/procedures (Barrett, 2000).
Because of their status within the organization, managers and supervisors must
strive to demonstrate safe work practices and make decisions that reflect their
commitment to safety (Cook & McSween, 2000). Management must understand how it
influences behavior through its action or inaction (Barrett, 2000). If an employee puts in a
maintenance request, the management must react and ensure that the work environment is
reasonably free from hazards. Management holds the responsibility and authority, and
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controls the resources that make up the environment. If management chooses not to
address the hazard or spend the money to eliminate the hazard, it will not be addressed.
Consequently, in the future when that same employee or a fellow co-worker makes a
request, he or she may operate under the assumption that management again will be nonresponsive. Not only must management ensure a safe environment but they must also
provide feedback so that employees are motivated to actively participate. Trust is a key
issue in this type of situation. Behavioral processes work best when a high degree of trust
exists between management and employees (Barrett, 2000).
Why Behavior-Based Safety Needs to Change
Some safety professionals believe that behavioral safety needs to be improved.
Changes within today's organizations and their workforces are presenting challenges that
current established models do not address (Fern & Alzamora, 1999). As older employees
leave organizations to retire, their knowledge and safety training leave with them. Their
replacements are novice, inexperienced individuals who know little about safety. At the
same time, there has been rapid organizational change. Safety professionals insist that
behavioral safety approaches need to be aligned not only with older employees but with
younger employees as well. In addition, behavioral safety approaches must be sustainable
in rapidly changing environments and provide highly visible returns on investment. In
order to make these changes, a number of behavioral safety elements must be added to
the original behavioral safety approach. Leadership commitment, a focus on task-specific
safety behaviors, multiple metrics, outcome-based goals, and multi-directional feedback
have been identified as the new key elements of behavioral safety.
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Employees must drive the safety effort because they live with it on a daily basis,
but management should support this effort (Fern & Alzamora, 1999). Management
should never take over safety, but key leaders should support the safety effort in the form
of visible actions rather than tacit, verbal approval. Research indicates (Fern & Alzamora,
1999) that safety is more likely to be sustained over time when it has the support of key
leaders.
Many of today's behavioral safety approaches focus only on the most common
behaviors at a given site, which represent only a portion of the key safety behaviors (Fern
& Alzamora, 1999). Advocators of this focus believe that employees will be able to
generalize these behaviors and determine how to translate them to their own jobs.
However, either generalization often does not occur, or it does not occur often enough to
be meaningful. Behavioral safety will have more of an impact on avoiding incidents if
safety behaviors are more specific.
Many current behavioral safety approaches only measure the number of safety
observations conducted (Fern & Alzamora, 1999). Fern and Alzamora stated that this
measure cannot capture the critical information organizations need today. Multiple
metrics can more accurately provide multiple measures of return and help diagnose the
root cause of the problems. Fern and Alzamora believe that frequency of feedback,
employee values for safety, and the degree to which an organization takes visible,
measurable actions to support a safety effort should be measured as well. Depending on
the situation, not every organization needs to use all of these measures (Fern &
Alzamora, 1999).
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The ABC model is generally considered a good model for identifying
fundamental, yet essential elements of behavioral safety (Fern & Alzamora, 1999).
However, research (Fern & Alzamora, 1999) indicates that our thought processes play a
large role in our daily decisions concerning which actions we take or avoid. Cognitive
research suggests the ABC model should be changed to the ABCO model. In this model,
"O" stands for "outcome," the longer-term results of engaging in safe or unsafe
behaviors. ABCO would help employees recognize the potential impact such a behavior
would have on their lives. It would motivate employees to engage in safe behaviors and
avoid unsafe behaviors. For example, wearing goggles and avoiding an eye injury is
beneficial for employees because they can continue with their everyday life. Not wearing
goggles and experiencing an eye injury could cause blindness, reduced time on-the-job,
or reduced quality of life (Fern & Alzamora, 1999).
Users of behavioral safety approaches must also recognize that employees
frequently engage in potentially safe or unsafe behavior, even when they are not at work
(Fern & Alzamora, 1999). One way to help make employees aware of behavioral safety is
to receive feedback from managers and for managers to receive feedback from
employees. Feedback should also occur between peers and come from well-respected
peer safety leaders. In order for feedback to be constructive, however, employees must be
trained in how to provide proper feedback and how to respond to feedback. They must be
taught what quality feedback is and when and how to take control of a feedback
discussion. If indeed behavioral safety is to successfully evolve, these key elements need
to be acknowledged. In this manner behavioral safety efforts address the needs of the
future, while becoming more cost effective and easier to sustain.
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Injury Prevention in Organizations
Workplace injury and employee illness adversely affect employee quality of life
and exert an astounding negative effect on corporate profitability (Ficca, 2003).
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, a total of 1.7 billion lost-workday injuries
occurred in 1999. The majority of injuries and illnesses (41%) were sprains and strains,
most often involving the back. The cost of injury and illness is continuing to rise. The
total of both direct and indirect costs is estimated to be $240 billion. As the U.S.
workforce ages and healthcare premiums continue to rise, the health-care cost problem
will only worsen. Employees have been working longer hours and are spending more
time at work than they are at home. U.S workers are going home in a dramatically
different condition compared to that in which they reported to work. Employers and
employees both have safety responsibilities, but unsafe behaviors are the primary cause
of workplace injury (Ficca, 2003).
Research has shown that awareness levels and unsafe attitudes cause two major
types of behavior (Topf, 1998). The first type of behavior is unconscious, automatic, nondeliberate behavior. It is characterized by daydreaming, inattention, and stress, which
results in loss of focus. The second type of behavior is conscious, premeditated,
deliberate behavior, such as taking shortcuts, bypassing procedures, and similar
calculated risk-taking. Most injuries (Topf, 1998) result from the first type of behavior.
Increasing awareness and changing attitudes can decrease the occurrences of these nondeliberate behaviors, as well as the application of behavioral safety principles.
The use of behavior-based safety programs for injury prevention is required to
make the shift to safer, healthier behaviors (Ficca, 2003). The goal is to translate
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intentions, training, and processes into actual behaviors, however involvement at every
level of the corporate operation is necessary to produce the desired outcome. The main
focus of a behavior-based safety program should be directed by its intended positive
impact on corporate productivity and the lives of workers and their families (Ficca,
2003).
Research on Behavior-Based Safety
Several studies (Komaki et al., 1978; Komaki, Heinzmann, & Lawson, 1980;
Reber & Wallin, 1984; Reber, Wallin, & Duhon, 1993; Boyce & Geller, 2001; Williams
& Geller, 2000; Chhokar & Wallin, 1984) have documented the effects of the behavioral
safety approach. Three of these will be discussed in detail including the reasons for the
studies and what was found as a result.
Komaki et al. (1978) used a behavioral approach to improve safety practices in a
food manufacturing plant. They used a direct observational technique emphasizing a
variety of set practices. In this technique, employees were positively reinforced for
performing safe behaviors. The researchers found that when the desired performance was
identified, the workers recognized exactly what and how behaviors should be performed.
Employees agreed upon a reasonable goal that allowed for less than perfect performance.
Instead of focusing on avoiding an accident, the workers focused their efforts on
motivating one another to perform safely. Feedback was used as reinforcement, which
improved performance substantially. The feedback was positive, objective, and
influential. It was also provided frequently and publicly. At the conclusion of their study,
Komaki et al. found that when safety was behaviorally defined and positively reinforced,
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workers reacted favorably to the program and substantially improved their safety
performance.
In a subsequent study, Komaki et al. (1980) asked the following two questions: Is
training alone sufficient to substantially improve performance on the job? Is it necessary
to provide feedback to maintain performance? This study was different from Komaki et
al. (1978) previous study in that the last study included a component analysis that
analyzed the intervention in terms of each of its components. Desired safety practices
were behaviorally defined for four sections of a city's vehicle maintenance division.
Komaki et al. used a multiple-baseline design with a reversal component, that included
the following five conditions: baseline, Training only 1, Training and Feedback 1,
Training only 2, Training and Feedback 2. The researchers found that performance did
not substantially improve until feedback was introduced, which led them to conclude that
training alone is not sufficient to substantially improve and maintain performance. The
results of the study suggested that "although proper training is essential, safety training
alone is inadequate, that more attention should be devoted to the provision of
consequences for desired performance, and that feedback is an effective and readily
accepted motivational strategy" (Komaki, 1980, p. 268).
Reber and Wallin (1984) attempted to demonstrate the benefits of providing
knowledge of results (KR) in addition to goal setting in a strategy to improve
occupational safety in a farm-manufacturing firm. The researchers hypothesized that
safety performance would improve when specific, difficult, and accepted goals were set.
It was also hypothesized that performance would further improve when feedback was
provided to employees about their department's performance in relation to their goal.
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Reber and Wallin used a multiple-baseline design with the following four phases:
baseline, training only, training and goal setting, and training, feedback, and KR. They
found that although behavioral safety performance improved significantly after a goal
was assigned and accepted, in general the goal was not achieved until KR was provided.
In their final conclusion, Reber and Wallin stated that the addition of KR resulted in even
greater increases in performance than goal setting plus training and training only.
Present Study
The available research on behavioral safety and its application suggest that
workplace safety is an important concern for many organizations. Behavioral safety
approaches have proven effective in reducing accidents. Behavioral safety programs can
be established in organizations to target specific behaviors related to the job. One of the
first steps in BBS is an analysis of accidents to identify specific unsafe behaviors that
have resulted in accidents.
In the present study, a behavioral accident analysis was used to discover the
reasons for an alarmingly high accident rate at a precision die-casting company in
western Kentucky. The analysis will provide the foundation for the development of a
behavioral safety program for this company. Currently, this company has a rate of 23-24
accidents per year, a rate the company considered to be too high a rate. It is costing the
company thousands of dollars and its employees are at risk. The company wanted to
know what, where, when, and how these accidents were occurring. Consequently, the
analysis of accidents over the past three years was undertaken.
Four hypotheses addressed the details of this dangerous and costly problem.
Consistent with behavioral safety research (Komaki et al., 1978; Komaki et al., 1980;
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Reber &Wallin, 1984), the first hypothesis is based on the assumption that the majority of
injuries will have behavioral causes.
Hypthosis 1: More than eighty percent of the accidents will be the result of unsafe
behaviors.
The company under study has three shifts. Management suspects that a disproportionate
percentage of accidents occur on the third shift. Research on shift work (Hazelwood,
2003) indicates that this is most often the case and that the graveyard shift is 20% more
likely to suffer severe accidents than the day shift. The following hypothesis addresses
the times at which accidents are most likely to occur:
Hypothesis 2: A disproportionate percentage of accidents will have occurred
during the third shift.
This company has several areas in which employees work. Areas include the machine
shop, die cast room, maintenance, quality, furnace room, tool room, and shipping and
receiving. Based on the Human Resource Director's observations, the following
hypothesis was made:
Hypothesis 3: Fifty percent or more of accidents will have occurred in the
machine shop than the other areas in the company.
The injuries that have been occurring in this company range from lacerations to pulled
muscles. The Human Resource Director suspects that a disproportionate percentage of
injuries are lacerations.
Hypothesis 4: A disproportionate percentage of injuries that have been occurring
are lacerations.

Method
Accident Reports
Data were collected from the company's archives, which included OSHA logs
and detailed accident reports. Three years of data from 2000 to 2002 were used to get a
reliable description of the type of accidents occurring. Each accident report includes the
date of the accident, what time the accident occurred, where the accident occurred, a
detailed description of what occurred (probably the unsafe behavior that resulted in the
accident), if the worker was able to return directly to work, if faulty equipment was
involved, the conditions of the working environment, how to avoid similar accidents (i.e.,
the safe behavior that would prevent accidents in the future), and the supervisor's
response.
Procedure
Data were retrieved from each accident report, including the date of the accident,
what time the accident occurred, where the accident occurred, a detailed description of
what occurred, if the worker was able to return directly to work, if faulty equipment was
involved, the conditions of the working environment, how to avoid similar accidents, and
the supervisor7s response. These variables, identified above, were coded and entered into
a Microsoft Excel data base. In order to establish interrater agreement, a second rater
coded the accidents. A summary sheet was developed to facilitate coding (see Appendix).
As seen in the Appendix, the coding of some variables, such as cause of accident and
what could be done to prevent similar accidents, required more judgment than others,
such as type of injury, location of accident, shift, and working conditions. Out of 2,567
ratings, the raters agreed on 93.5% of the judgments. The raters then discussed each
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accident report where there was any lack of agreement until a consensus of 100%
agreement was reached.

Results
A total of 151 accident reports were used from the three-year span of 2000-2002.
Hypothesis 1 was tested by compiling the percentage of accidents caused by unsafe
behavior. It was supported, (tiso = 7.48; /K. 001), as 87.4% of the accidents were caused
by unsafe behavior. The other 12.6% were due to equipment (4.6%), repetitive motion
(2.6%), or reasons that were uncertain (5.3%). Some might argue that repetitive motion
actually is an unsafe act that can be modified by changing work behavior.
Between each section of the plant and three different shifts, the number of
employees differ. Therefore, it is important to examine the ratio of the number of
accidents to the number of employees in order to determine which group has a higher rate
of accidents per employee. These ratios are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
Hypothesis 2, which predicted that a disproportionate percentage of accidents will
have occurred during the third shift, was tested by calculating the number of accidents by
shift. A Chi-square one-sample test was conducted to determine if a disproportionate
percentage of the accidents occurred on the third shift. Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
The Chi-Square test indicated that a disproportionate percentage of accidents occurred
during the first shift %2 (3, A^ = 151)= 122.78,/?< 001. Of 151 accidents, 61.6% occurred
during the first shift, 22.5% occurred during the second shift, 15.2% occurred during the
third shift, and 0.7% did not indicate shift. The accidents to employee ratios in Table 1
further support the finding that accidents occur at a higher rate during the first shift than
the other two shifts.
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Table 1
Accidents to Employee Ratios
Shift

Ratio

First

93/130 = 1 accident per 1.40 employees

Second

34/81 = 1 accident per 2.38 employees

Third

23/60 = 1 accident per 2.61 employees

Note: Cumulative accidents over three years
Hypothesis 3 predicted that 50% or more of accidents will have occurred in the
machine shop rather than other areas in the plant. A one-sample t-test (tiso = -8.06;
p<.001) indicated that fewer than 50% of accidents occurred in the machine shop. Thus,
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. To further explore this hypothesis, locations were
grouped into two categories according to the frequency of accidents. The first group
included those locations in which very few accidents occurred (i.e., fewer than 10). The
second group included those locations in which 10 or more accidents occurred. A Chisquare one-sample test was conducted on locations where a higher number of accidents
occur to determine if a disproportionate percentage of the accidents occurred in the
machine shop. The Chi-Square test indicated that a disproportionate percentage of
accidents occurred in die cast %2 ( 3 , N = 126) = 66.70,p<.001. Accidents occurred in 9
locations in the company; 45% occurred in die cast, while 22.5% occurred in the machine
shop. However, when placed in proportion to the number of employees that were in each
location, the accidents to employee ratios indicate that accidents occur at a higher rate in
the Furnace room with 1 accident per .69 worker (See Table 2).
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Table 2
Accidents to Employee Ratios
Location

Ratio

Furnace Room

13/9

Die Cast 302

68/83 = 1 accident per 1.22 employees

Tool Room

11/14 = 1 accident per 1.27 employees

Machine Shop 403

6/11

= 1 accident per 1.83 employees

Machine Shop 404

4/8

= 1 accident per 2.00 employees

Machine Shop 406

5/10

= 1 accident per 2.00 employees

Machine Shop 401

34/74 = 1 accident per 2.18 employees

Die Cast 303

3/10

= 1 accident per 3.33 employees

Machine Shop 402

4/19

= 1 accident per 4.75 employees

= 1 accident per .69 employees

Note: Cumulative accidents over three years
Hypothesis 4 predicted that a disproportionate percentage of accidents would be
lacerations. In order to test this hypothesis, type of accident was grouped into two
categories based on frequency. The first group included those accidents low in frequency
(i.e., fewer than 10 times). The second group included those accidents which occurred 10
times or more. A Chi-square one-sample test was conducted on the frequently occurring
accidents to determine if a disproportionate percentage of the accidents were lacerations.
The Chi-Square test supported Hypothesis 4. A disproportionate percentage of accidents
were in fact lacerations, %2 (5, N= 110) = 12.29, p<.05. Of 151 accidents, 19.2% were
lacerations, 14.6% were due to eye injuries, 11.9% were due to back pain/strain, and
11.9% were strains.

Discussion
The accident analysis indicates that the accidents occurring in this place of
business are primarily the result of unsafe behavior, as 87.4% of the accidents had
behavioral causes. This finding is consistent with past research conducted by Komaki et
al. (1978 & 1980), who found 90% of accidents have a behavioral cause. Behavioral
accidents can occur for several reasons. Employees are frequently inadvertently
reinforced for unsafe behavior because tasks are completed quickly or without the hassle
of safety equipment. Once employees have worked in the same job for a period of time,
they may skip or forget safety steps. In addition, seasoned workers may not pay as much
attention as they did when they first started. Based on the accident analysis results, the
company can begin to develop a safety training program that focuses on safe employee
behaviors. This change will in turn help prevent similar accidents from occurring in the
future.
The results of the accident analysis indicate that 61.6% of accidents occur during
the first shift. This time frame is anytime between 6:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. During the
first shift, an almost equal number of accidents occurred in Die Cast 302 and Machine
Shop 401. It might be assumed that a high number of accidents occur during the first shift
because more employees work in these areas during this period of time. However, the
accidents to employee ratio for shift indicate that the high accident rate is still present
even when expressed as accidents per employee (see Table 1). Based on this information,
the company can emphasize working with first shift die cast and machine shop
employees to decrease the number of accidents.
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Based on research conducted on shift work (Hazelwood, 2003), it was assumed
that most accidents would occur during the third shift, which is in the time frame of 10:30
p.m. to 7:00 a.m. It has been found that graveyard-shift workers typically make five times
as many serious mistakes and are 20% more likely to suffer severe accidents than those
who work 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (Hazelwood, 2003). The increased accident rate is
reportedly due to severe fatigue from being on an irregular schedule. However, there has
been research supporting the results of the present accident analysis. In a study focusing
on rest breaks and accident risk, Tucker, Folkard, Macdonald (2003) found that there
were significantly more accidents on the day shift than on the night shift. The researchers
were not sure of the reason, but speculated that reduced supervision on the day shift
might have caused the difference. It would be of interest to the company to determine if
accidents occurred disproportionately at certain times during the shift, for example, at the
beginning or end of the shift.
The accident analysis indicates that 45% of accidents occur in the area known as
Die Cast 302. In this particular area, employees work with large machinery and hot, sharp
materials. Some machines are manual, while others are controlled by computer programs.
The number of accidents may be high due to the equipment with which these employees
work. It is also a large area with many employees. However, in the Furnace Room, there
is 1 accident per every .69 employees versus 1 accident per every 1.22 employees in Die
Cast 302 (See Table 2). These ratios indicate that even though the furnace room only has
9 workers, accidents are occurring at a higher rate than in other areas of the plant. With
this information, the company can focus on ways to make the furnace room and other
areas with high rates of accidents a safer place to work. They can also make the Furnace
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Room and Die Cast 302 focal points of their safety training program. It would be of
interest to determine why Die Cast 302 has the second highest accident rate in the plant
while Die Cast 303 has the second lowest accident rate in the plant.
The results from the analysis confirm that a disproportionate number of accidents
were lacerations. Lacerations may occur more often due to the sharp materials that
employees handle in their job. The second and third most common type of accidents were
eye injuries and back pain/strain, respectively. Eye injuries occur because employees fail
to wear their safety glasses. There were instances in which metal flew under the safety
glasses, but the glasses were most likely not pressed tightly on the employees' face. Back
pain/strain can occur if employees use their back instead of their legs or arms to lift heavy
objects. It can also occur if an employee attempts to lift or reach something that is beyond
their strength capability. In the development of a safety training program, the company
should focus on safety equipment, proper lifting techniques, and instruct its employees to
follow safe behavioral procedures in each task they undertake. In addition, the company
should encourage supervisors to better document the safe behavior that would have
prevented the accident.
This accident analysis provides the precision die-casting company answers to its
questions of who, how, and why accidents are occurring and can serve as the basis for the
development of a behavioral safety training program. An effective safety program will
include management commitment and employee involvement, worksite analysis to
identify present and potential hazards, hazard prevention and control, and safety and
health training (Bennett-Alexander & Hartman, 2001). Hopefully, the company will use
the results of this analysis as an impetus to decrease the number of accidents occurring in
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its plant, and thus potentially save thousands of dollars and give the workers a safer
environment in which to work.
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Appendix

Coding Scheme and Summary Sheet
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Type of Injury
1—Laceration
2—Sprain
3—Strain
4—Eye injury
5—Carpal Tunnel
6—Back pain/strain
7—Bruised
8—Burn
9—Rash
10—Arm/shoulder injury
11—Miscellaneous pain
12—Hand injury
13—Leg/foot injury
Job Title/Occupation/Loc of Acc.
1—Maintenance 002
2—Shipping and Receiving 101
3—Quality 201
4—Tool Room 204
5—Furnace Room 301
6—Die Cast 302
7—Die Cast 303
8—Machine Shop A 401
9—Machine Shop B 402
10—Machine Shop C 403
11—Machine Shop 404
12—Machine Shop 406
13—NDG
Time of Day/Shift
1—AM—Morning
2—PM—Day
3—AM—Graveyard
4—PM—Evening
5—Uncertain
6—NDG
Cause of Accident
1—Behavioral
2—Equipment
3—Repetitive Motion
4—Uncertain
On premises at time of accident?
1—yes
2—no
3—NDG
Treatment received at plant?
1—yes
2—no
3—NDG

Did employee return to work?
1—yes
2—no

3—NDG
Restrictions?
1—yes

2—no

3—NDG
Referred to Physician?
1—yes
2—no

3—NDG
Faulty equipment?
1—yes
2—no

3—NDG
Did employee fail to follow
instructions?
1—yes
2—no

3—NDG
Working conditions
1—warm
2—humid
3—windy
4—wet floor
5—dry floor
6—other

7—NDG
What can be done to prevent similar
accidents?
1—Be more careful
2—Minimize flash
3—Rotate jobs
4—Monitor equipment
5—Proper use of equipment/tools
6—Proper use of safety equipment
7—Report accidents when they occur
8—Better equipment
9—Ask for assistance
10—other
Could it have been prevented by
employer or employee?
1—yes
2—no
3—uncertain

AR #

1. Occupation at time of accident
2. Location of Accident
3. Employed at facility
years
4. In present job
years
5. On premises
6. Time of Day
7.

Shift

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Cause of Accident
Type of Injury
Treatment received
Returned to work
Restrictions?
Referred to physician
Faulty equipment
Did employee fail to follow instructions
Working conditions at time of accident

Unsafe Behavior

Proper safe behavior

Could it have been prevented by employer or employee?
How?

